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Abstract
Background: One controversial issue in the larger cap-and-trade debate is the proper use and
certification of carbon offsets related to changes in land management. Advocates of an expanded
offset supply claim that inclusion of such activities would expand the scope of the program and
lower overall compliance costs, while opponents claim that it would weaken the environmental
integrity of the program by crediting activities that yield either nonexistent or merely temporary
carbon sequestration benefits. Our study starts from the premise that offsets are neither perfect
mitigation instruments nor useless "hot air."
Results: We show that offsets provide a useful cost containment function, even when there is
some threat of reversal, by injecting additional "when-flexibility" into the system. This allows
market participants to shift their reduction requirements to periods of lower cost, thereby
facilitating attainment of the least-cost time path without jeopardizing the cumulative
environmental integrity of the system. By accounting for market conditions in conjunction with
reversal risk, we develop a simple offset valuation methodology, taking into account the two most
important factors that typically lead offsets to be overvalued or undervalued.
Conclusion: The result of this paper is a quantitative "model rule" that could be included in future
legislation or used as a basis for active management by a future "carbon fed" or other regulatory
authority with jurisdiction over the US carbon market to actively manage allowance prices.
Background
The efficiency of the natural carbon sink is in decline, with
land-use change contributing approximately 16% of
annual carbon emissions from 2000–2006 [1]. While the
future trajectory of land-use emissions will depend on a
variety of uncertain factors, ranging from future patterns
of rural development to the impacts of climate change on
disturbance and forest health [2-5], the land-use contribu-
tion to total emissions will almost certainly remain quan-
titatively significant [2]. Consequently, architects of US
cap-and-trade policies have sought to include instruments
to reduce such emissions by issuing carbon offsets for
projects that avoid expected emissions or deliberately
sequester additional carbon [6]. Offsets are economically
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and politically attractive because, by expanding the scope
of the program to include lower cost options, they
increase the number of compliance opportunities in the
market, exert downward pressure on carbon prices and
minimize the overall social cost of abatement [7].
However, the wisdom of including large quantities of mit-
igation from outside the energy sector (and from the land-
use sector, in particular) has been widely questioned by
those concerned with a wide range of potential problems.
These include potential future losses of carbon on-site
that could result from natural disturbance, poor manage-
ment or other factors (collectively referred to as "non-per-
manence") and potential losses of carbon off-site due to
activity shifting or market price adjustments that drive up
carbon losses elsewhere (typically called "leakage"). Exist-
ing regulations governing offset project development have
attempted to account for the possibilities of non-perma-
nence and leakage by applying a discount factor to per-
mits commensurate with their perceived reversal risk. For
example, the northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI) discounts offset credits at 10% [8] and early
versions of the Waxman-Markey bill discounted offset
credits at 20% [6]. The Voluntary Carbon Standard
requires that a proportion of the offset credits be depos-
ited in a buffer pool, with that proportion determined by
a categorical risk assessment [9].
While this approach internalizes some of the risks associ-
ated with such carbon assets, the discount factors used in
practice are largely qualitative and fail to account for the
economic value of such instruments. As a result, they raise
the costs of forest carbon without acknowledging any of
the benefits that risky carbon offsets might provide by
mitigating upside price shocks and reducing overall miti-
gation costs. This paper shows how to quantitatively
adjust the discount factor to account for these benefits.
The resulting "model rule" could be used by regulators to
dynamically adjust the supply of offsets in an emissions
permit market to more finely manage carbon prices.
Results
Typically, broad concerns over environmental integrity
take two distinct forms, reflected in requirements that off-
sets be both "additional" and "permanent" [10]. The first
criterion effectively requires that the activity under consid-
eration yield emissions reductions that would not other-
wise occur. Assignment of "additionality" therefore
hinges on confidence in the relevant emissions baseline
path, since this is the trajectory against which any reduc-
tions will be measured and against which credits will be
awarded.
The second criterion requires that a project safely seques-
ter carbon over the long time horizons demanded by the
climate system itself. An offset is permanent, in an opera-
tional sense, if the emissions reduction does not reappear
as a source in a later compliance period, although the
proper length of this horizon is debatable. Offset credits
from land-use projects are particularly important to eval-
uate in this context, because carbon stored in forests or
other terrestrial systems could escape back into the atmos-
phere for a variety of reasons, ranging from natural distur-
bances (e.g., fire) to inadequate protection from human
interference (e.g., logging) [11]. As discussed above,
future losses of carbon off-site due to economic leakage
could also jeopardize the effective permanency of stored
carbon.
Reversals of either kind (on-site or off-site) are not prob-
lematic unless they fail to be properly internalized by the
underlying crediting framework. In that case, permits may
be awarded in excess of the net integrated emissions
reductions specified by the policy. In a world in which the
trajectory of carbon loss could be reasonably well antici-
pated, this outcome could be avoided in one of two ways.
First, project developers or offset buyers could individu-
ally retain liability for future carbon loss, in which case
those entities would be responsible for purchasing addi-
tional permits ex post, whenever sequestered carbon was
shown (through monitoring) to have escaped.
A number of mechanisms to place liability on the buyer of
offsets have been proposed. One is to create "rental con-
tracts" for temporary sequestration [12]. Another is to
issue so-called temporary sequestration credits (tCERs)
under which holders of such credits must make up the car-
bon content of these credits in other ways after the term of
the temporary credit expires [13]. Finally, credits for risky
assets might be issued in the usual manner, but with the
regulator imposing an additional condition that those
holding such assets acquire private insurance just as vehi-
cle owners are required to demonstrate proof of insurance
before registration. Of course, this requirement is feasible
only if there is an existing insurance market for offsets. For
an example of how this might be implemented, see the
model rule developed as part of the northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative [8].
Alternatively, the regulator could discount credits ex ante
(at the time of certification) to account for anticipated
future carbon loss, thus effectively transferring liability to
itself. In this case, the government would issue less than
one tradable permit for every ton of carbon sequestered
(assuming each permit represents the legal right to emit
one ton), thereby acquiring a greater number of permits
up front to sufficiently compensate for future carbon
losses. A similar objective could also be pursued through
the creation of a "buffer pool" [9] rather than through
direct discounting. While allowing private entities theCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:3 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/3
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opportunity to internalize risk is arguably more efficient
than these approaches, some form of regulator discount-
ing or "buffering" is likely to be needed in the short run
before a robust offset insurance market develops and
because private liability would be difficult to implement
in the case of future off-site reversals.
While the failure to properly account for reversal risk leads
to the possibility of overvaluation, a failure to acknowl-
edge the economic efficiency benefits of (even risky) off-
sets can lead to systematic undervaluation. As an example,
consider an offset project in which all of the carbon ini-
tially sequestered is lost in a future compliance period.
Fully discounting carbon reversals, as above, would imply
that no credits should be issued for such a project. How-
ever, if credits were initially issued at a time when permit
prices in the market were high, and credits for future car-
bon loss were later surrendered at a time when prices were
low, then this combined transaction would lower total
abatement costs by allowing market actors to endog-
enously shift abatement across time in pursuit of an eco-
nomically efficient outcome.
When liability for future carbon losses is privately held,
those trading offsets must decide for themselves when
these types of transactions offer credible arbitrage oppor-
tunities, given their own expectations about future prices.
Under this type of regulation, firms would use a collection
of compliance tools, consisting of both risky and non-
risky assets, to navigate an efficient abatement path. In the
alternative case in which credits are discounted up front,
the regulator would need to determine an appropriate dis-
count rate that incorporates both reversal risk and the ben-
efits of increased when-flexibility. The regulator, however,
would like to employ a discount rule that mimics, as
much as possible, the incentives that individual actors
would face were they themselves held liable for future car-
bon losses.
For example, suppose a project developer sequesters two
tons of carbon in the present period when prices exceed
the expected discounted long-run average price by a factor
of two, knowing that all of the carbon stored initially will
ultimately be lost within the relevant time horizon. In
response to this submission, the regulating agency prints
two permits, issues one to the project developer (effec-
tively discounting at 50% from the developer's perspec-
tive) and retains one for itself. The regulator immediately
liquidates its own permit in the secondary market and
uses the revenue to buy back and retire two permits in the
future, once the price drops back to (or below) the long-
run average value. Because the regulator removes two per-
mits from circulation in a future period, the carbon loss is
properly internalized and the cumulative integrity of the
program is not violated.
In the above example, the regulator is essentially con-
straining liquidity in the market when it believes that
prices have risen to levels above those justified by funda-
mentals. This mechanism would thus complement firm-
level borrowing decisions (assuming such actions were
allowed by the policy) and help to collapse speculative
bubbles early. Of course, any mechanism designed to
enhance when-flexibility, whether realized through firm-
level borrowing decisions or through the actions of a cen-
tral regulator, necessarily requires judgments to be made
about future market conditions, and prices in particular. A
limited discretionary mechanism, like the one proposed
here, simply provides an additional check on the judg-
ments made by firms and spreads the decision about
whether to shift abatement across a more diverse set of
actors in the system.
Tightening and loosening constraints on offsets in real
time and in response to actual market conditions has been
proposed previously in the context of a "carbon fed" [14],
but markets may behave better in this case if clear, quan-
titative rules are written up front. When it comes to risky
carbon assets, the regulator's fundamental objective is to
make sure that the crediting system correctly balances the
tendency to overvalue offsets (by not sufficiently account-
ing for reversal risk and the implied risk to the climate sys-
tem) with the tendency to undervalue them (by not
sufficiently accounting for the benefit of when-flexibility).
Within the broad class of risky assets, we contend that the
underlying economic and environmental goals would be
best served by explicitly quantifying reversal risk along a
continuum and transparently and dynamically adjusting
valuations on a project-specific basis to reflect the nature
of such risk in the context of the broader carbon market.
The application of such a valuation rule by a central
authority would increase when-flexibility (lower compli-
ance costs) without violating the cumulative environmen-
tal integrity of the system.
Consider the expected price path, Pe(t) of carbon permits,
derived, for example, from model estimates of a prescribed
emissions reduction path [15]. In effect, this price path rep-
resents the "target price" that the regulator hopes to defend
through the constrained use of offsets. Suppose offsets are
allowed into the system in some period t = τ, but that a frac-
tion f of the carbon initially sequestered is lost over the rel-
evant time horizon. The parameter f  in this model will
inevitably vary by project or project type, but existing
research provides ample guidance [16]. The immediate
economic benefit (per ton of carbon) of allowing such cred-
its into the market is the spot price, Ps(τ), because that
reflects the marginal (per ton) cost of an avoided permit.
The total economic cost of using the offset is the sum of the
deployment cost of the offset itself, C(τ), and the present
value of the future permit that must be purchased at theCarbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:3 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/3
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future target price to compensate for the eventual carbon
loss. Assuming that Pe(t) rises at the long-term interest rate,
the net present value of the cost is C(τ) + f·Pe(τ).
It is worth noting that the full present value of the carbon
loss term (assuming the fraction f is lost in time T) can be
written as f·Pe(τ)·erT·e-rT. The exponentially increasing
term represents the steadily increasing forward price on
carbon (as forecast by most model assessments), and the
declining exponential term represents the discount factor
(with the discount rate also assumed to be equal to the
long-term interest rate). Because the exponential terms
cancel, the longer expression simplifies to f·Pe(τ), which
is what appears in the preceding paragraph.
The value of the offset V(τ) can be measured by one's will-
ingness to pay for such an instrument, which in turn, can
be found by solving for C(τ) when the total cost of using
the instrument exactly balances the benefit of using it.
This returns the maximum price at which offsets would be
an attractive compliance vehicle: V(τ) = Ps(τ) - f·Pe(τ).
Further dividing through by the spot price, the value of the
offset relative to the spot price is δ = V(τ)/Ps(τ) = 1 - f·Pe(τ)/
Ps(τ). Since, from a cost containment perspective, we are
most concerned with the case where Ps(τ) > Pe(τ), it is use-
ful to define S as the relative price shock at t = τ, or equiv-
alently, as the factor by which the spot price exceeds the
target price, so that S = Ps(τ)/Pe(τ). This implies that δ = 1
- f/S. If δ is the relative value of the offset, it is also the fac-
Applied discount factor (δ) in percent as a function of the share of sequestered carbon expected to be lost over the relevant  time horizon (f) and the factor by which the spot price for permits exceeds the target price set by the regulator (S) or by  which it exceeds the expected discounted future equilibrium price Figure 1
Applied discount factor (δ) in percent as a function of the share of sequestered carbon expected to be lost over 
the relevant time horizon (f) and the factor by which the spot price for permits exceeds the target price set by 
the regulator (S) or by which it exceeds the expected discounted future equilibrium price. The limits described in 
the main text are easy to identify on this figure. The no-reversal limit is found along the left edge of the figure; the discount fac-
tor of 100% is independent of the value of S. The full reversal limit returns a low discount factor when S is small (lower right-
hand corner) but a high discount factor when S is large (upper right-hand corner).Carbon Balance and Management 2009, 4:3 http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/3
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tor by which a given ton of emissions should be dis-
counted at the time of crediting.
Discussion
The discount factor δ is plotted as a function of f and S in
Figure 1. A few limiting cases are worth discussing explic-
itly. First, consider the case f → 0, in which there is no
reversal over the relevant time horizon. In that case, δ →
1, meaning that the offset credit should not be devalued
at all at the time of crediting, regardless of market prices.
That is, the credit should be treated like any other ton of
emissions abatement from the energy sector.
For many activities related to changes in land manage-
ment, 0 <f < 1, but the exact risk-adjusted value of f may
not be known precisely. For simplicity, consider the alter-
native limit f → 1, which implies that all carbon originally
sequestered is ultimately lost. Arguably, this is a good
approximation when the relevant time horizon is very
large. Under this limit, δ depends on the size of the rela-
tive price shock S. When S is extremely large (e.g. Ps(τ) →
∞), then δ → 1. Intuitively, when the spot price is high rel-
ative to the target price, even permits associated with full
reversals would not be discounted much because the
opportunity to shift abatement is valuable when spot
prices are considerably higher than expected future prices.
This situation is most likely to be encountered during the
early periods of a new compliance regime, when technol-
ogy substitutes, like carbon capture and storage (CCS),
may not be widely available. In the opposite extreme,
where there is no cost shock whatsoever so that S = 1 (i.e.
Ps(τ) → P e(τ)), then δ → 0 and no permits would be
issued for offsets associated with full reversals, because
there is no economic value in moving abatement to future
periods when the spot price exactly equals the discounted
expected future price.
In applying this rule to cases where Ps(τ) < Pe(τ), we rec-
ommend that S be set to 1. If the policy allows permits to
be banked for future use, as most do, then prices that fall
short of expectations probably do not indicate an ineffi-
cient time path (such inefficient allocations should largely
be arbitraged away through banking), but rather that
abatement costs are simply lower than projected. In these
circumstances, offset valuations should be based only on
the extent to which they result in perfect sequestration,
not on broader market conditions.
Conclusion
The analytic framework described here provides practical
guidance to policymakers charged with regulating the
future carbon market. Our model is agnostic about the
extent to which liability for reversal risk should reside in
private or public hands, as long as it is internalized in
some way. If internalized privately, then individual enti-
ties may use valuation tools like the ones above to deter-
mine the optimal use of risky assets within their larger
mitigation portfolio. If risk is internalized publicly by dis-
counting ex ante, which may be particularly necessary if
reversals result from economic leakage off-site rather than
physical losses on-site, then the regulator may apply our
valuation tools to the project certification process itself.
Details of the discounting algorithm could be included in
legislation or left to a regulatory body to implement, in
either case providing a methodology by which forest car-
bon and other risky carbon assets could be properly val-
ued and regulated within a future cap-and-trade system.
Methods
All methods are described in the main text of the manu-
script.
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